The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the production of the postconflict economy within the knowledges and practices of the development industry. It examines how international financial institutions (IFIs) render "objective" understandings through which the post-conflict economy can be elaborated. First, this is accomplished by formatting the complex political economy of Lebanon within the domain of normal economic categories. In this fashion, even the war itself-its violence, traumas, and the transformations it wrought-is reduced to a mere "idiosyncratic shock" that may be overcome through the application of conventional development solutions. 
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naJIB HouranI aBstraCt The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the production of the postconflict economy within the knowledges and practices of the development industry. It examines how international financial institutions (IFIs) render "objective" understandings through which the post-conflict economy can be elaborated. First, this is accomplished by formatting the complex political economy of Lebanon within the domain of normal economic categories. In this fashion, even the war itself-its violence, traumas, and the transformations it wrought-is reduced to a mere "idiosyncratic shock" that may be overcome through the application of conventional development solutions.
Second, this is then sustained by the systematic elision of the IFIs themselves-their knowledges and political involvement-from the processes they claim to analyze. Once the economy is constructed as an object in this fashion, the development industry can then set about implementing standardized development projects. One such project, the World Bank's Revenue Enhancement Project, which is investigated here, sought to liberalize Lebanon's property regime in line with contemporary Neoliberal thought. A major effect of these interventions is consolidation of power by wartime politico-economic networks, the existence and operations of which are invisible to the very Neoliberal regime that has made it possible. This becomes visible through examination of the network logic underwriting post-conflict reconstruction in Beirut, a logic at variance with the imagined economy behind Neoliberal prescriptions.
IntroduCtIon
With the rise of the so-called New Wars at the end of the twentieth century, internal conflicts-their prevention, management, and transition toward peace-have become central concerns of the development industry. By virtue of their size and capacity for the production of knowledge, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been successful in setting the international community's agenda for the prevention and management of civil wars and post-conflict recovery; an agenda in which both institutions play increasingly important roles. 1 Rooted in what Duffield calls the Liberal Peace paradigm, the development industry's understanding of internal conflicts, its humanitarian discourses, and its approach to postconflict reconstruction and development are increasingly circumscribed by the degree to which they promote, consolidate or defend the institutionalization of a neo-liberal world order. 2 Accordingly, the IFIs, once loath to explicitly engage in political engineering, are increasingly willing to do so in support of market liberalization, and they view post-conflict environments as especially amenable to such comprehensive projects. 3 As the chapters in this volume make clear in relation to questions of trauma, reconciliation processes, and post-conflict nation-and statebuilding, such environments are not simply contexts within which action takes place. Rather, discourses that international institutions and bilateral development agencies deploy in part constitute post-conflict environments themselves. Accordingly, the contributors to this volume, each in his or her own area of expertise, examine the enormous work such institutions put into the very production of the post-conflict environment, and how the particular constructions they produce render some analyses and interventions "reasonable," "realistic," and possible, while excluding others. Nowhere is the construction of this environment clearer than in the domain of postconflict reconstruction and the economic discourse within which it is embedded.
While the World Bank and the IMF increasingly recognize that each context is shaped by its own political peculiarities, they remain primarily concerned with the liberation of what liberalism nonetheless takes to be an eco-nomic realm animated by universal principles, from the contaminants of politics, culture, and violence. 4 This construction of conflict and postconflict environments as domains that somehow exist outside processes of universal economic development represents the ontological baseline from which debates about post-conflict reconstruction spring. This chapter, then, focuses specifically upon this reification of the economic, and the factors and forces operant in post-conflict Lebanon that this reification hides from view.
Drawing upon World Bank and IMF studies of Lebanon's transition from war to peace and the results of nearly three years of ethnographic and archival fieldwork in Beirut, I trace the constitution of Lebanon's post-conflict economy and the effects of this construction on politico-economic processes and the possibilities of a positive peace. 5 First, I examine the IFIs' standard narrative, presented in virtually every IFI report on post-conflict Lebanon, of the country's pre-war free-market miracle, conflict-induced collapse, and the promise of a post-war Neoliberal renaissance. I focus not upon whether this narrative is more or less accurate, but rather examine how this simple drama in part constitutes, or constructs, the post-conflict environment it claims to diagnose. I suggest that the tale of a once and future freemarket Lebanon is not meant to be an accurate description of Lebanese history or a depiction of realistic possibility. Rather, I argue, it serves as a framing device that prepares the reader for the discursive production of the postconflict environment as a particular kind of object.
I then seek to understand how the International Financial Institutions'
Neoliberal discourse transforms a war-torn nation, suffering from multiple violences, traumas, dispossessions, and indignities, into an object of development amenable to dispassionate debate and standardized policy initiatives. The second section explores this question through an examination of one World Bank-sponsored technical assistance project intended to liberalize the Lebanese property regime. How did the discourse of post-conflict reconstruction format the problems the project was meant to solve?
The third section examines the resultant property regime transformation and its effects. Through an examination of the networks of provision that produce upscale urban space, I reveal that which was hidden behind the IFIs' allegedly technocratic depiction of the post-conflict environment.
More precisely, I show "the market" to be constituted not of liberalism's rational individuals, but rather of powerful politico-economic networks. 6 These networks, I will argue, working within and alongside the state, were able to successfully turn the marketization processes to their own decidedly illiberal interests. From where did these networks emerge, and how did the IFIs' Neoliberal approach to reconstruction transform their operations?
As will become clear, the neo-liberalization of the property regime failed to produce the promised prosperity. Was the failure to produce a postconflict renaissance the result, as the IFIs usually claim when their expertisedriven prescriptions produce catastrophe, of imperfect knowledge, faulty implementation, or political interference with what were otherwise sound economic policies? In this final section I show how that which was suppressed in the discursive construction of the post-conflict environment enabled the continued pursuit of civil war, albeit by other means. The weapons deployed in the post-conflict conflict, I will show, included the international financial institutions themselves, and the market discourse they promote.
ConstItutIng tHe Post-ConflICt envIronment
The opening paragraphs of any IMF or World Bank report on post-conflict Lebanon contain, in a clear and condensed form, what has become the standard account of the country's wartime collapse and peacetime efforts toward recovery. The narrative begins with the assertion that pre-war Lebanon was a laissez-faire miracle, marked by openness and minimal regulation. As one of the region's only free-market economies, readers will learn, Lebanon played an important role between East and West, and, by virtue of these policies, rapidly grew into a prosperous regional centre for banking, finance, tourism insurance, and trade.
The account will then introduce the 1975-90 civil war and list its consequences: estimates of the dead and wounded, the damage to infrastructure and industry, the flight of human resources, the decline in investment, and
Lebanon's separation from increasingly global flows of labor, goods, information, and capital. 7 Central to the narrative is the deterioration of public finances. The state's inability to collect revenues even as it maintained "a minimum of public services" produced large debt-financed fiscal deficits. The resulting "erosion of private sector confidence," according to the IMF, "led to continuous pressures on the Lebanese pound" and rampant inflation. But then, suddenly and quite unexpectedly, "Confidence was restored."
According to both IFIs, the first post-war parliamentary elections and the installation of a new government, in October 1992, ended the economic crisis "virtually overnight." 10 According to the World Bank, this surge in "confidence" triggered conversion of dollar deposits to lira and a capital inflow so massive that the BdL was able to increase its US dollar reserves by one billion dollars in the month of November alone. 11 Yet, despite this reversal of fortune, the IFIs warned, the Lebanese economy remained on a precipice.
"Given the speculative nature of these inflows," the Bank cautions, "the current stability is vulnerable to changes in expectations, and will not be lasting until fundamental macroeconomic imbalances, in particular the fiscal deficit, are corrected." 12 Significant economic reforms-rigorous expenditure controls, revenue enhancement, and the privatization of reconstruction itself-would be necessary to ensure sustainable post-conflict recovery.
One could question the accuracy of this narrative. Indeed, the celebratory depiction of Lebanon's pre-war laissez-faire miracle was long ago discredited. More recently, Gaspard, for example, shows that laissez-faire Lebanon performed far less admirably than the IFIs suggest. When compared with other less developed countries at the time, Lebanon's GDP growth reflected "quite an average performance." 13 True, per capita income was higher-due to Lebanon's position in the regional colonial architecturebut it was highly concentrated in a small group of elite families surrounding an even smaller financial-mercantile oligarchy. Per capita GNP growth was, moreover, lower than all but one of the region's non-oil producing coun- 19 and Mitchell 20 have shown how development economics conceptually produces the "less developed country" as a discretely bounded entity, the internal political and economic components of which can be subjected to techno-managerial interventions toward an imagined universal "development." How do the IFIs, through the knowledge they produce, contribute to the production of the very environments under study?
Expert Knowledge from Above and Outside
The simple drama with which IFI reports begin makes an important contribution to the construction of the post-conflict environment as an object amenable to "objective" study. This objectification, of necessity, requires the constitution of the IFIs' own positions as seemingly outside and above postconflict Lebanon through the systematic removal of the IFIs from the historical and economic analyses they present. Accordingly, the standard narrative neglects the significant role the IMF and World Bank played in producing the economic crisis of 1992.
For example, barely a month after the war's end on October 13, 1990 , the IMF argued that the public deficit "is the primary cause of financial instability" and made reconstruction aid contingent upon an austerity program that froze public sector wages and ended subsidies on the basic foodstuffs and fuels upon which the average Lebanese citizen relied. 21 Moreover, the narrative neglects the fact that the first post-conflict government acquiesced to these demands in 1991, and in 1992 imposed regressive consumption taxes, such as the 18 percent tax on fuels, in line with IFI prescriptions. Not surprisingly, then, the link between IFI-imposed structural adjustment and the social instability that it provoked, instability that culminated in popular demonstrations and strikes that brought the first government down and threatened a return to war, is also hidden from view. 22 The IFIs' role was more significant still. Clearly, the IFI pressure was central to the 1992 economic crisis and the social unrest that brought down Lebanon's first post-conflict government.
Yet of necessity they must absent themselves from the narrative they produce about the crisis. To do otherwise, as Mitchell shows, would undermine the imagined exteriority that enables development expertise to present itself as rational and disinterested, generated outside and above the object of study. To do otherwise is to open the door to an investigation of the IFIs themselves and their relations to transnational politics and circuits of power.
It is to undermine their claim to objective expertise. 25 
A Coherent Picture
Once the relation of exteriority is achieved, the narrative seeks to re-locate the "dislocated" Lebanon within the universal realm of development eco- While the true magnitude of the losses will likely never be known, by all indications they were enormous. Banque al-Mashreq, alone, suffered losses in excess of 300 million dollars. 35 In addition to covering deposits the Central assets not repurchased by the commercial banks-ranged from the highly unlikely figure of "just a few million" to "nearly a billion dollars." 38 These figures seem to give credence to a report in the daily al-Nahar that it was such efforts to bail out the wealthiest Lebanese and their banks that led to the 500 million dollar decline in foreign currency reserves during the same period. 39 It was this diversion of government resources to bail out the banking sector, not subsidies for basic foods and fuels for the increasingly impoverished Lebanese people, that deprived the government of much-needed resources for reconstruction. The massive bailout and further subsidies to the financial oligarchy and militia-related financiers remain unexplored within analyses that hide these politico-economic processes behind a technical tale of simple fiscal imbalance. It is the erasure of these dynamics that enables the relocation of the post-conflict environment within the realm of normal economics and universal development, and so converts a public bailout of the wealthiest Lebanese into a mere "idiosyncratic shock" to be overcome by standardized and normalizing development interventions that crushed the average citizen. The memo identifies the absence of adequate "staffing, procedures and systems, equipment, statistical data and policy analysis" at the Ministry of Finance as an obstacle to rapid recovery. These institutional constraints undermine the Ministry's ability to rapidly raise revenue through the customs, the cadastre and land registration administrations, or to manage taxation and public expenditures. Therefore, the Lebanese government was in dire need of the "significant and immediate technical assistance" that only the World Bank and its development-industry partners could offer.
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While the memo foregrounds post-war institution building in the name of strengthening government capacities, the "Technical Assistance Project" The centerpiece of the Project was the creation of new property representations within a new digitized and automated property registry and cadastre.
In contrast to the president's memo, however, improved state capabilities in revenue assessment, collection, and management to meet reconstruction needs are presented as secondary to benefits to the "private sector." The Annex stresses the "adverse impact" of the current system "on the private sector's land-related investment for housing and other purposes." Echoing de Soto, the authors argue "private investment depends on a well-functioning land registry and cadastre, including the establishment of a proper landrights data-base and simplification of the land registration and adjudication system." It concludes: "The cadastre-based information systems are crucial not only for promoting private investment activity and institutional credit, but also for strengthening the collection of property taxes and for reducing related cumbersome procedures" (6).
Project officials stressed the same priorities. While the new technologies would allow more rigorous administrative control the benefits of digitization and automation to the "private sector" were far more important, and would dramatically expand private investment. 50 Indeed, they stressed that the new system adopted global standards that would provide regional and global finance, insurance and real estate industries, and large institutional investors with more accurate market knowledge, and the ability to rapidly access and assess that knowledge for investment purposes. The newly digitized administrative architecture would force Lebanon's economy, once outside the dynamics of universal development, to the regional forefront of universal capitalist globalization.
As already noted, the financial assetization of property requires not sim- for the right to occupy and use a premise for a specified period of time, and to transfer that right to another mustathmir at a future date. The payment for this temporary sale, known as Khuluu, often made in advance of construction, financed the production of much of Beirut's built environment. As an investment, the higher the khuluu paid, the lower the monthly rent.
Khuluu also circulated with housing and other commercial forms of tenancy and was transferable by tenants to their heirs. As a figure that rises and falls with the value of the premises, the payment often represented a sizeable investment on the part of tenants, an investment from which they might profit upon vacating a premise. More important to small family businesses, the khuluu was a value against which shop owners could borrow to finance their own operations.
Development industry understood khuluu simply as "an unearned rent" that, in accruing to the tenant, prohibited rational operation of the real estate and rental markets. The plan combines five programmatic elements within a framework following the classic North American "dumbbell" mall, which locates large "anchor" tenants, such as department stores and cinemas, at the four corners of a rectangular interior space that contains medium-sized and small shops. The Solidere plan called for a major department store, such as Saks Fifth Avenue, to be the northwest anchor. The northeast would house a multi-screen Cineplex, and the southwest an inner city supermarket. The southeastern anchor was a new jewellery market, meant to recall the famous Suq al-Sagha, once located on Martyrs Square. The fifth element, the "core,"
organized along the historic, pre-war grid of north-south streets and eastwest passageways, contained medium-sized "semi-anchor" spaces to accommodate the US-based Gap or the Spanish ZARA, and large tertiary spaces to attract name-brand stores such as Timberland, Guess, and Calvin Klein. By virtue of strict adherence to such international standards, Solidere officials argue, there would be no doubt that "the internationals" would come to the new Souks, and the company and its investors would reap handsome rental streams. 
Wartime Verdun
The wartime destruction of the City Center forced a decentralization of retail throughout Beirut, and, more importantly, gave rise to a new set of retailers. 65 These new capitalists, many from humble origins, eased into the im- for the possible consolidation of a positive peace, is the fact that it has also enabled them to hide that power through technocratic analyses in which they appear only as normalized members of "the private sector."
Inqilaab al-Hariri
The free-market ideology of Neoliberalism, anchored in an imaginary "eco- For Mitchell, it is economic knowledge production and the practices of governance derived from them that makes this separation between the economic and political seem to be real. Without that boundary, which posits an economic sphere marked by its own universal rationality that pre-exists cul-ture or politics, the scientific justifications for market society, to say nothing of class privileges within that society, evaporate to reveal a world of political power and predation, the normative defence of which becomes difficult to sustain.
The ontological separation is key to the externalization of liberalism's repeated failures to live up to the promises it makes. In the case of Lebanon, the International Financial Institutions' construction of a post-conflict environment, while creating a coherent picture intelligible only from within the discourse and denying its own participation within the tale it narrates, cannot but set the stage for the failure of Neoliberal reconstruction, and a redoubling of development-industry efforts to format the complex Lebanese political economy into Neoliberal terms. As Ferguson argues, however, failure does not mean that the interventions are without powerful effects. These "instrument effects" are the unintended outcomes that arise from the elisions required by development discourse to make itself whole, and from the ability of powerful forces to work in and through the discourse in pursuit of their own interests. 94 Three such instrument effects can be identified in the case of Lebanon. Second, this domestication of politico-economic processes has the further important effect of enabling these illiberal networks to hide their power in and over the state apparatus and economic processes. It enables them to colonize, contour, or bypass the state, and so turn its administration and economic reforms to their own purposes, first of which is the consolidation of their power. This weakening of the state further restricts access to economic opportunity, as would-be entrepreneurs find themselves caught up in network rivalries or blocked by formal and informal monopolies. Moreover this network power combines with progressive impoverishment of the populace to produce increasing political and economic dependence of the latter upon the former. Indeed, today, sectarian clientelist networks take on the form of civil society NGOs, as elite-funded social welfare/patronage systems or family organizations such as the now famous Hariri Foundation, and political parties such as Hizballah increasingly provide social welfare services and access to education and economic opportunity. 95 Together these combine to produce a third effect of Neoliberalism's failed promise: the consolidation of wartime social divisions and the deterrence of democracy. In the case of Lebanon, this manifested in the solidification of a sectarian troika that governed throughout the 1990s, that cooperated to expand and protect the network activities of which they were a part, but also to suppress or tame political forces, such as those of the non-sectarian labor movement, that may have challenged their control. 
Notes

